

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS  
PINE BLUFF DIVISION**

COURTNEY SNEED  
ADC #119285

PLAINTIFF

V. NO: 5:13CV00184 DPM/HDY

JAMIE SOWELL *et al.*

DEFENDANTS

**PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

**INSTRUCTIONS**

The following recommended disposition has been sent to United States District Judge D.P. Marshall Jr. Any party may serve and file written objections to this recommendation. Objections should be specific and should include the factual or legal basis for the objection. If the objection is to a factual finding, specifically identify that finding and the evidence that supports your objection. An original and one copy of your objections must be received in the office of the United States District Court Clerk no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of the findings and recommendations. The copy will be furnished to the opposing party. Failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact.

If you are objecting to the recommendation and also desire to submit new, different, or additional evidence, and to have a hearing for this purpose before the District Judge, you must, at the same time that you file your written objections, include the following:

1. Why the record made before the Magistrate Judge is inadequate.
2. Why the evidence proffered at the hearing before the District Judge (if such a hearing is granted) was not offered at the hearing before the Magistrate Judge.

3. The detail of any testimony desired to be introduced at the hearing before the District Judge in the form of an offer of proof, and a copy, or the original, of any documentary or other non-testimonial evidence desired to be introduced at the hearing before the District Judge.

From this submission, the District Judge will determine the necessity for an additional evidentiary hearing, either before the Magistrate Judge or before the District Judge.

Mail your objections and “Statement of Necessity” to:

Clerk, United States District Court  
Eastern District of Arkansas  
600 West Capitol Avenue, Suite A149  
Little Rock, AR 72201-3325

### **DISPOSITION**

Plaintiff Courtney Sneed, currently held at the Randall Williams Correctional Facility of the Arkansas Department of Correction (“ADC”), filed a *pro se* complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on June 17, 2013. Because Plaintiff’s complaint was too vague to determine if he stated a claim for relief, the Court ordered him to file an amended complaint, which he did on June 26, 2013 (docket entry #4).

#### **I. Screening**

Before docketing the complaint, or as soon thereafter as practicable, the Court must review the complaint to identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” In *Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (overruling *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41 (1967), and setting new standard for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted), the Court stated, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment]to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do....Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” *citing* 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004). A complaint must contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, not merely conceivable. *Twombly* at 570. However, a *pro se* plaintiff’s allegations must be construed liberally. *Burke v. North Dakota Dept. of Corr. & Rehab.*, 294 F.3d 1043, 1043-1044 (8th Cir.2002) (citations omitted).

## **II. Analysis**

According to Plaintiff, Defendant Jamie Sowell falsely alleged that he sexually assaulted her in a consensual incident on April 25, 2013, at the ADC’s Tucker Unit. After an investigation, Plaintiff was cleared of all allegations. On May 10, 2013, Plaintiff was transferred to the Randall Williams Correctional Facility with no pending charges, and put back into general population. However, on May 22, 2013, Plaintiff received a disciplinary charge written by Defendant Gregg E. Moore of the Tucker Unit, and was convicted of several charges in connection with the incident. Plaintiff claims that at least one of the thee charges for which he was convicted was false, and that he was denied due process in his disciplinary hearing. Because Plaintiff suffered no atypical and significant hardship as a result of his convictions, and false disciplinary charges are not actionable, Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed.

As a result of his convictions, Plaintiff spent 30 days in punitive confinement, was reduced in class, and had restricted phone, commissary, and visitation privileges, for 60 days. A reduction in class does not implicate a liberty interest. *See Madewell v. Roberts*, 909 F.2d 1203, 1207 (8th Cir.

1990)(noting that an inmate has no right to any particular class status); *Strickland v. Dyer*, 628 F.Supp. 180, 181 (E.D. Ark. 1986)(finding that because Arkansas case law does not protect a prisoner's right to any particular classification and there is no federally protected right regarding classification, inmate could not prevail on claim that he was deprived of due process due to disciplinary penalty of two-step class reduction). Likewise, 30 days of punitive confinement and 60 days of restricted privileges does not amount to an "atypical and significant" hardship that would give rise to due process protection as set forth in *Sandin v. Conner*, 515 U.S. 472, 483-484 (1995). The Eighth Circuit has "consistently held that administrative and disciplinary segregation are not atypical and significant hardships under *Sandin*." *Portly-El v. Brill*, 288 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir. 2002). *See also Wycoff v. Nichols*, 94 F.3d 1187, 1188-90 (8th Cir. 1996)(no liberty interest arose when Plaintiff served 45 days in administrative confinement before disciplinary decision reversed); *Richardson v. Pevey et al.*, Case No. 5:12CV00096, 2012WL 1167086 (E.D. Ark. March 15, 2012) (unpublished opinion) (no protected liberty interest when inmate served 30 days in punitive isolation and commissary, telephone, and visitation privileges, were suspended for 60 days).

In the absence of a protected property or liberty interest, Plaintiff is left with at most a false disciplinary charge. However, a false disciplinary is not itself a constitutional violation. *See Sprouse v. Babcock*, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989)(citing *Freeman v. Rideout*, 808 F.2d 949, 951-52 (2nd Cir. 1986), cert denied, 485 U.S. 982 (1988)). Accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>To the extent that Plaintiff may be raising a claim regarding the conditions of his confinement during his punitive time, the Court notes that he described no conditions which deprived him of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, or caused him any harm, during the time he served the disciplinary sentence. *See Smith v. Copeland*, 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996) (discussing requirements to establish a condition of confinement claim).

### **III. Conclusion**

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
2. This dismissal count as a "strike" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
3. The Court certify that an *informa pauperis* appeal taken from the order and judgment dismissing this action is considered frivolous and not in good faith.

DATED this 8 day of July, 2013.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE